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Mr. Feldstein: Let me say Jim Hamilton has said some challeng-
ing things about capital requirements for Federal Reserve-regulated 
institutions and accounting standards. Maybe somebody from the 
Federal Reserve System who understands what the current practice 
is would like to comment on that. I think that would be helpful so 
we understand what gap there is—if any—between what is recom-
mended and what is currently being practiced. 
Mr. Fischer: I want to talk about an issue which comes up repeat-
edly, which is asset bubbles and monetary policy. I didn’t expect to 
hear it here, but Rick Mishkin introduced it. There is a fairly subtle 
point to be made, which is that if you read what is actually said, that 
is fine. But then I wonder why we keep saying things that sound dif-
ferent. Now, what I am talking about? 
Rick says the issue of how central banks might respond to house 
prices is not whether they respond at all, but whether they respond 
over and above the response called for in terms of objectives to sta-
bilize inflation and employment. I don’t think you would ever know 
whether they have responded over and above. If I took what he said 
literally, he and I agree. 
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But then I wonder why we keep hearing this: “We shouldn’t re-
spond to asset prices. We should wait until the bubble collapses. We 
should deal with it ex post, etc.,” which seems to indicate there is a 
problem there. I have gotten used to that rhetoric. I don’t think there 
are any Chinese colleagues here today, but they tend to make policy 
in terms of metaphors. If they were here, they might tell us that a 
stitch in time saves nine. 
I can’t understand why you wait for a bubble to explode and pos-
sibly get into major crises. I don’t know whether we are in a major 
crisis, but we are in an awkward situation at the moment as a result 
of having watched something happen and having decided not to do 
anything about it. 
We are willing to accept open-mouth policy. I know some central 
bankers. I think Jacob Frenkel is one and Lucas Papademos is an-
other who did pop bubbles with an open-mouth policy successfully. 
That’s fine, but if you are looking at this and you are worried about 
the consequences, what exactly is the problem with edging monetary 
policy in the direction of responding to something that might be 
ugly? You never know until it’s over whether it is going to be ugly or 
not. Why the strong insistence that we won’t do anything about it 
until it’s over? I don’t understand that, and we have heard it repeat-
edly and repeatedly. 
I think we are in a sense in which people are protesting too much. 
I know a famous central banker who said to me, “I know I am the 
lender of last resort, but you will never hear me say that in public.” 
Central banks probably on more occasions than they would like to 
admit should respond to asset price bubbles but don’t want to say 
they will for fear of the consequences. 
Mr. White: I am a little confused. I am looking at Rick’s paper, and 
Rick says, “The standard lifecycle view has equal effects from hous-
ing and financial wealth.”
Then, I look at John Muellbauer’s paper, and John’s paper says, 
“The classical lifecycle theory suggests that the housing wealth effect 
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Now, maybe the standard lifecycle view is different from the clas-
sical lifecycle theory, but, to me, it seems like these two statements 
are contradictory. I would like to hear the two of them speak to this. 
Maybe Charlie Bean wants to come in as well. I don’t know. 
I must say that I side with John. I have never really understood 
how, particularly for an aggregate nation as a whole—an increase 
in house prices—which constitutes not only a form of implicit rev-
enue for the owner but also an explicit cost looking forward for the 
consumer of housing services, increases wealth. Now, this is an enor-
mously important issue because if John is right that we are picking 
up in the econometrics just the credit aspect of it, then we are back 
to the conclusion that this spending “must be repaid.” Intertemporal 
optimization implies you spend more up front but at the price of 
having to pay back later. Put otherwise, if John is right, we have an 
issue looking forward here in terms of higher personal savings rates, 
which will slow growth. If Rick is right, well, then perhaps we don’t. 
But I do want to underline this is an enormously important issue. 
Secondly, I would make the point that I agree with Stan Fischer 
in responding to the question of whether we lean against the bubble 
or clean up the mess afterward. Rick is basically saying that we can’t 
lean, but we can clean up. I believe you can make equally strong ar-
guments for the conclusion that you can lean and that you might not 
be able to clean up. So, I am with Stan.
Mr. Svensson: I would like to make a comment on Rick’s discus-
sion of the implications of housing and house prices for monetary 
policy and, in particular, on the appropriate monetary policy response 
to house price developments. A good way to summarize this discus-
sion is by reference to standard flexible inflation targeting. Flexible 
inflation targeting means that the central bank wants to stabilize not 
only inflation around the inflation target, but also resource utiliza-
tion. In practice, it boils down to choosing an interest rate path such 
that the resulting forecast of inflation and resource utilization looks 
good relative to the inflation target and the relative weight on re-
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The reason you need to consider the whole interest rate path and 
not just the current interest rate is that it is really expectations about 
future interest rates and not the current interest rate that matter for 
the response of the economy to policy. The reason you need to use a 
forecast of inflation and resource utilization is because of the lags in 
the response to policy. 
Furthermore, the interest rate path and forecast of inflation and 
resource utilization need to be communicated to the market and gen-
eral public in order to affect private sector expectations—“managing 
expectations,” as Mike Woodford has expressed it. Therefore, a few 
central banks, including the Riksbank, have started to publish their 
own interest rate path. 
This way of thinking has implications for the appropriate mon-
etary policy response to house prices. Whether you should respond 
to those or not depends only on whether the developments in house 
prices affect the forecast of inflation or resource utilization. Suppose 
that house price developments, for an unchanged interest rate path, 
shift up the forecast of inflation or resource utilization so it no longer 
looks good. Then you need to shift up the interest rate path, so as to 
counter the effect of house price developments and again make the 
resulting forecast of inflation and resource utilization look good. 
The same goes for asset prices, bubbles, or any new information. 
You should filter any new information through the forecast of infla-
tion and resource utilization. That filtering tells you whether you 
should respond to the new information or not. This is very easy to 
say. The principles are simple and can be summarized in a few words, 
as I have done. The difficulty is to judge in practice when and when 
not asset prices, potential bubbles, and house prices affect the fore-
cast of future inflation and resource utilization. The principles are 
simple, but the practice is difficult.
Mr. Feldstein: To me, the issue of bubbles is very much tied up 
with the risk of the bursting of the bubble, and that is a very probabi-
listic issue. It’s not what the basic forecast is, but what the probability 
is that the developments that you see in asset prices could lead to a 
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In a probabilistic way of thinking about policy, you may do a little bit 
of leaning, even though you know it is going to have collateral effects.
The mean forecast is all you need in a world in which you can 
ignore uncertainty because you have a linear model and a quadratic 
loss function.
Mr. Harris: I hate to pile on to Rick here on this bubble question. 
Is it really true that central banks can’t identify bubbles? It seems to 
me from sitting on Wall Street through the last decade—particularly 
if you look at the housing bubble—by 2004, at least probabilistically, 
you are pretty convinced there was a bubble going on. It wasn’t just 
that real prices of homes were rising rapidly, but you also had a surge 
in hybrid mortgages, you had self-identified investors popping up all 
over the place, you had an experience where hot markets were getting 
hotter—a sign that people were moving from cool markets into the 
markets where you could actually make money. Bob Shiller by 2004 
had a lot of company around the issue of housing bubbles. 
Even Alan Greenspan admitted there was froth in the housing mar-
ket, which, in checking Roget’s Thesaurus, I found that was the be-
nign way to describe a possible bubble. So, isn’t bubble identification 
just another kind of tough forecast for a central bank?
Mr. Mishkin: Let me talk about this issue about identifying bub-
bles first. In fact, I would like to take a behavioral-type view along 
the lines Bob Shiller has talked about. One thing that is true is when 
people see something ex post (after the fact), they think they knew 
what was going on ex ante (before the fact). It is a very common 
thing. You think you are smarter than you actually were. To give an 
example in this context, it is true that ex post we knew there was by 
1999-2000 a bubble in the stock market. 
But a lot of people were talking about bubbles in 1995 and 1996. 
In fact, a friend of mine told me he was talking to a bunch of econo-
mists at the University of Chicago at the time. They all pulled out of 
the market in 1995 and so missed out on a lot of price appreciation. 
The key point here is it is always easy ex post to identify a bubble. 
And you also not only have to identify the bubble, but you also have 
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right. The theoretical literature that thinks hard about what is the 
appropriate response is incredibly mixed. 
Clearly, the position that Lars Svensson is taking is a little more 
technical way of describing the position that I have advocated. I know 
this is controversial. I do have to say that I disagree with Stan and 
Bill White on this. The issue here is that there are a lot of costs trying 
to anticipate bubbles when we don’t have the stock of knowledge to 
know what to do if there is a bubble or the stock of knowledge to 
know that a bubble exists. In fact, the other problem is that when we 
in central banks get into trying to respond to potential bubbles, we 
start to lose our basic mission. That can be extremely high-cost, both 
in terms of what we do and what the public thinks we are doing.
Mr. Hamilton: This term “bubbles” gets used by different people 
in different ways. One of the ways it is commonly used would imply 
profitable personal investment strategies. I don’t think we can agree 
that everybody knew there were profitable personal investment strat-
egies. That is why I am inclined to focus on the issues that I raised of 
whether there are some kind of institutional incentives or something 
going on that is part of this broader phenomenon. 
Mr. Mishkin: There are some Nordic examples that are classic in 
terms of what Jim talked about, which was that there was poor pru-
dential supervision, excessive risk-taking, which led to a huge boom 
in asset prices. The issues he is raising are, in fact, serious ones.
Mr. Rosengren: My question is to Jim, and the observation is that if 
you look at a lot of the things that Rick Mishkin described in terms of 
where we missed, it seems to be tied to the subprime market, and a lot 
of that market is being financed outside of depository institutions. 
When you look at a lot of these structured investment vehicles, 
many of them are not sponsored by banks. Furthermore, many secu-
ritizations and structured products are done outside the banking sys-
tem but with liquidity provisions provided by banks. These securiti-
zations could include loans from receivables that could include loans 
for cars, that could be home equity loans, or that could be mortgages. 
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to stop structured investment vehicles from financing highly risky 
assets. If that is where a lot of the problems were, I would like to have 
a better idea of how you see broker markets being supervised.
If what you want to stop is high-risk lending, which I am not sure 
should be the goal, but if that is what you wanted to do, I am not 
sure whom you want to put the capital ratios on. I am not sure bank 
supervision is going to be equipped to deal with many organizations 
that are completely outside of depository organizations.
Mr. Barnes: I don’t really want to belabor the point, but Rick 
Mishkin said that central banks don’t have any informational advan-
tage over markets, yet he also said that central banks with supervisory 
powers can take action if they see excessive risk-taking. It seems to me 
there might be an inconsistency there between being able to identify 
asset bubbles and being unable to identify excessive risk-taking. If 
you can do one, you should be able to do the other.
Mr. Hale: In the last eight weeks, the challenge confronting the 
Federal Reserve has changed quite profoundly. We have gone from 
a housing recession to what I would now describe as a crisis of in-
formation in the financial markets. There has been a total loss of 
confidence in the credit rating agencies. As a result, investors are very 
unsure how to price various asset classes. 
Therefore, the commercial paper market has shrunk by $200 bil-
lion in the last three weeks. In the next six weeks, $1.3 trillion of 
commercial paper will mature in conduits operated by European and 
American banks. 
We had some major accidents in Germany in July. The odds are very 
high there will be more accidents because of this crisis of information. 
How can the Federal Reserve in these new circumstances address 
the problem of a crisis of information?
Mr. Lindsey: I would like to add to Jim Hamilton’s list of reasons 
why the response mechanism may be slower, and that has to do with 
the nature of model-based decision-making. We certainly saw it quite 
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credits in this cycle. It is abundantly clear in the appraisal standards. 
It was clear in the late 1990s with regard to bottom-up appraisal of 
future profit growth. There are plenty of reasons why there are insti-
tutional lags in the system. I am not sure that is the reason why we 
might go to your solution, but it does highlight your problem. 
One final example of linear extrapolation from model-based decision-
making is—I don’t know how to say this politely—if one reads the policy 
statements following Federal Open Market Committee meetings, nearly 
all of them in the last year have pointed out that housing conditions have 
deteriorated more than we expected.
Mr. Mishkin: Let me respond to Martin Barnes. I think there is 
a huge difference—you can actually have bubbles that are funda-
mentally driven by bad fundamentals, bad policies. Take the savings 
and loan crisis as a classic example. As economists, we knew exactly 
there was excessive risk-taking going on because of poor prudential 
supervision and regulation. In fact, it was pointed out continually 
by economists, and it then took a while before the political will was 
there to fix the problem. 
So, I think they are completely different. No inconsistency between 
the two.
Mr. Hamilton: Obviously, we don’t regulate all institutions, but if 
an institution is too big to fail, we ought to be worrying about it, not 
with the fed funds rate as the instrument, but we should seek regula-
tory supervision of it. So, that is how we would draw that line.
Mr. Fraga: Just a quick vote siding with Stan. It seems to me that 
everything we do when we run monetary policy is uncertain. On 
the side of perhaps being a bit more proactive, I would list a couple 
of points. One is the fact that things that affect the plumbing of the 
monetary system—the banks, in particular—do have more dangerous 
consequences than things that don’t. To the extent we see contamina-
tion of the plumbing, as I believe we do now, with risks appearing in 
the banks’ balance sheets that we didn’t think were there (very much 
in this spirit of Kindleberger’s story of how crises unravel), I think 
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The second point is that bankruptcy matters. In a textbook world, 
where bankruptcy has no costs, forced liquidations are not a prob-
lem. But in actual proceedings, the costs are tremendous. So, I’ll vote 
with Stan on this one too. 
Mr. Gurría: We come to these meetings for some answers and for 
best practices—what to do. If we don’t like what is happening, we 
agree that it should not have happened, then, first, how do we fix it, 
but then how do we avoid it from happening again? Ned Gramlich in 
his paper said something very much along the lines of Mr. Hamilton’s 
comments right now. Half of the originators were not federally super-
vised, and many of the originators were not even controlled by normal 
regulatory structures. Therefore, Mr. Rosengren says, “Don’t overdo it. 
Let’s not go too far.” 
But obviously there is a need to go further, if not too far, in terms 
of supervising. The old methods of quality and the old methods of 
capital and the old methods of maybe “too big to fail” because it has 
other impacts on people who have nothing to do with the problem 
are just as good as any other criterion. But it does seem like we should 
ask ourselves these questions, but also have some answers that are in 
the regulatory environment because we were a little complacent in 
the beginning of the process, thinking it was going to sort itself out. 